On December 22nd, 1941, the German Weapons Department was ordered to produce an effective self-propelled anti-tank gun for use on the Eastern front. The Czechoslovakian 38(t) chassis was used as the basis for the vehicle. The gun and carriage (without the wheels) was mounted on top of the superstructure using a special mounting plate. It was shaped like a bridge and was bolted to the roof in the front and rear. The gun shield moved with the gun, but the sides were fixed to help protect the crew. The driver and radio operator sat in the front of the hull. Behind them were three ammunition boxes that held 24 rounds. There were two ammunition boxes mounted on the side walls of the superstructure, which contained 12 rounds.

Originally designated the Panzerselbstfahrlafette 2 x 7.62 cm PaK 36, Hitler changed its name to Marder III on February 27th, 1944. Production started on March 24th, 1942 at the Bahmisch-Mahrische Maschinenfabrik AG factory in Prague. Initial output was set at 17 vehicles per month, with a target of 30 per month. By May 15th, 1942, 120 had been produced, and another 100 were ordered. These were produced from June to September 1942.

Pictured here is a 1:72 scale diecast replica of a German Sd. Kfz. 139 Marder III Ausf. H tank destroyer with PaK36 anti-tank gun that was attached to an unidentified unit then deployed to Stalingrad, Russia, during the winter of 1943. Sold Out!

Dimensions:
Length: 4-inches
Width: 1-1/2-inches

Release Date: March 2019

Historical Account: "Here is Stalingrad" - Under the code name Operation Uranus, the Russians launched their offensive to pinch off the German salient in and around Stalingrad on November 19th, 1942. The attacks fell on weakly held sectors north and south of the city, which were manned mainly by Romanian forces in the north and by a mixture of Romanians and units of the 4th Panzer Army in the south.

Despite the sudden attacks, decisive action by the German leadership could have saved the situation.

If General von Paulus, head of the 6.Armee, had acted boldly, sending some units north and south to hold the Russians at bay while withdrawing the bulk of his force from the ruins of Stalingrad, then much of his army would have been saved.

On the 21st, Paulus recommended to Von Weichs at the Army Group level, that he be allowed to withdraw the endangered Army to an arc on the Don and the Chir Rivers. Having initially supported such an immediate breakout, Von Weichs failed to act and the same evening passed on an instruction from OKH that Paulus was to hold the position on the Volga at all costs and that countermeasures to restore the situation were being implemented by the Fuhrer. In the meantime the Army would be supplied by air.

Senior officers under Paulus doubted if the required scale of an airlift could be achieved during a Russian winter. General Fiebig informed Paulus and his Chief of Staff Schmidt, 'Supplying a whole Army by air? Impossible! I warn you against entertaining such exaggerated expectations!' All of his Corps commanders argued for a breakout before the Red Army was able to consolidate its positions. General Hans Hube told Paulus: 'A breakout is our only chance.' Paulus remarks in his memoirs that 'In this situation, my acting against orders, particularly since I could not responsibly oversee the overall situation, would have pulled the operational foundation from under the supreme command. Such a course of action, against the plans of the overall leadership, leads to anarchy in the command structure.' However, perhaps the uniqueness of the situation required someone to take such a course of action. In addition Paulus was suffering continuing dysentery and a general rundown in health, but despite being urged to take sick leave in Germany, he refused.

On December 17th, Von Manstein gave the order for Paulus to break out towards the forces of LVII Panzer Corps, which had fought its way to within 30 miles of the pocket. Hitler, however, ordered that he was expected to both break out and establish a supply corridor, whilst still holding his positions within the city. Paulus rejected the order, arguing that his men were too weak to make such a move and that his vehicles had insufficient fuel to reach the relieving forces. On the 19th, Von Manstein sent an emissary, Major Eismann, into the pocket by air to urge Paulus to do all he could to attempt a break-out and meet the relieving force. It was the last chance for Paulus, but in the end he refused to move, quoting Hitler's orders that the present positions at Stalingrad should be held. He told Eismann, 'Thunderclap, (the code name for a complete breakout) is a catastrophic solution that should be avoided if at all possible.' From that point onward, their fate was sealed.