The Sonderkraftfahrzeug (Sd. Kfz.) 251 half-track had its origins in the same requirement as the smaller and lighter Sd. Kfz. 250. Intended as an armored personnel carrier, the Sd. Kfz. 251 entered service in 1939, and quickly became the standard means of transport for the panzergrenadiers. As it turned out, the Sd. Kfz. 251 was an especially useful vehicle, not only capable of keeping up with the newly formed panzer divisions but also providing invaluable support as well. All told, there were 22 special-purpose variants built, including the menacing-looking Stukavoss ("infantry Stuka"), which mounted a series of rocket launchers on the outer sides of the vehicle. Other variants included a flame-thrower, anti-tank, and communications vehicle, as well as an observation post, ambulance, and infra-red searchlight carrier. Despite suffering from early reliability problems, the Sd. Kfz. 251 was produced by the thousands, eventually becoming a trademark of the German panzertruppe on all fronts.

This particular 1:72 scale riveted version of the Sd. Kfz. 251/2 half-track is painted in a striking summer camouflage scheme. All detail including the 8cm Grenatwerfer 34 mortar in the pasenger compartment and the rivets on the hull have been wonderfully replicated true-to-scale. It features a metal chassis for added durability and the ammo rack inside is also represented from photo-etched parts. Sold Out!

Dimensions:
Length: 3-inches
Width: 1-inch

Release Date: April 2007

Historical Account: "What Sadness This?" - Military deception is an attempt to amplify, or create an artificial, fog of war or to mislead the enemy using psychological operations, information warfare and other methods. It overlaps with psychological warfare to the degree that any enemy that falls for the deception will lose confidence when it is revealed, and may hesitate when confronted with the truth.

One notable large scale example is the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Before Operation Barbarossa, the German High Command masked the creation of the massive force arrayed to invade the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and heightened their diplomatic efforts to convince Josef Stalin that they were about to launch a major attack on Britain. When they instead attacked Russia in force, Stalin refused for some hours to even believe that it had happened. Soviet forces were extraordinarily poorly prepared for the attack: On the day of Barbarossa, two-thirds of the Soviet ground forces were in the Soviet Far East preparing against attack by Japan. The military deception was so successful that only If not for the extraordinary logistical skill of Zhukov, the Germans would likely have taken Moscow, consolidated Europe and won the war.