War Stories

Pugachev's Cobra

In aerobatics, Pugachev's Cobra (or Pugachev Cobra) is a dramatic and demanding maneuver in which an airplane flying at a moderate speed suddenly raises the nose momentarily to the vertical position and slightly beyond, before dropping it back to normal flight. It uses potent engine thrust to maintain approximately constant altitude through the entire move. The maneuver supposedly has some use in close range combat, and is an impressive trick to demonstrate an aircraft's pitch control authority, high angle of attack (AOA) stability and engine-versus-inlet compatibility, as well as the pilot's skill. The maneuver is named after the Soviet test pilot Viktor Pugachev, who first performed the maneuver publicly in 1989 at the Paris Le Bourget air show.

While Pugachev's Cobra can be executed using only standard aerodynamic controls, it could be achieved more easily with modern thrust vectoring. In the latter case it would be an example of supermaneuverability, specifically poststall maneuvering. The Herbst maneuvering and the helicopter maneuver are other examples of the recent growing use of vectored thrust in 4.5 and 5th generation aircraft, manned as well as unmanned.

This maneuver could theoretically be useful when a combatant is being pursued closely by an opponent at a somewhat higher altitude. By executing the cobra, a pursued aircraft may suddenly slow itself to the point that the pursuer may overshoot it, allowing the previously pursued aircraft to complete the Cobra behind the other. This may give the now-pursuing aircraft an opportunity for firing its weapons, particularly if a proper pointing aspect (facing toward the former pursuer) can be maintained. Maintenance of the proper aspect can be facilitated when the aircraft employs thrust vectoring and/or canard control surfaces. The disadvantage of performing this maneuver is that it leaves the airplane in a low speed/low energy state, which can leave it vulnerable to attack from opposing aircraft. It can also be countered by maneuvers such as high yo-yo.

To engage targets using MRSI requires two things, firstly guns with the requisite rate of fire and sufficiently different size propelling charges, secondly a fire control computer that has been designed to compute such missions and the data handling capability that allows all the firing data to be produced, sent to each gun and then presented to the gun commander in the correct order. The number of rounds that can be delivered in MRSI depends primarily on the range to the target and the rate of fire, for maximum rounds the range is limited to that of lowest propelling charge that will reach the target.

Examples of guns with a rate of fire that makes them suitable for MRSI includes UK's AS-90, South Africa's Denel G6-52 (which can land six rounds simultaneously at targets at least 25 km (16 mi) away), Germany's Panzerhaubitze 2000 (which can land five rounds simultaneously at targets at least 17 km (11 mi) away) Slovakia's 155 mm SpGH ZUZANA model 2000. The Archer project (developed by BAE-Systems in Sweden) is a 155 mm howitzer on a wheeled chassis which is claimed to be able to deliver up to seven shells on target simultaneously from the same gun. The 120 mm twin barrel AMOS mortar system, joint developed by H?gglunds (Sweden) and Patria (Finland), is capable of 7 + 7 shells MRSI. The United States Crusader program (now cancelled) was slated to have MRSI capability. It is unclear how many fire control computers have the necessary capabilities.

Two-round MRSI firings were a popular artillery demonstration in the 1960s, where well trained detachments could show off their skills for spectators.

The French established the fortification to provide time for their army to mobilize in the event of attack, allowing French forces to move into Belgium for a decisive confrontation with Germany. The success of static, defensive combat in World War I was a key influence on French thinking. French military experts extolled the Maginot Line as a work of genius, believing it would prevent any further invasions from the east.

While the fortification system did prevent a direct attack, it was strategically ineffective, as the Germans invaded through Belgium, going around the Maginot Line. The German army came through the Ardennes forest and the Low Countries, completely sweeping by the line, causing the French army to surrender and conquering France in about six weeks.

The Maginot Line was impervious to most forms of attack (including aerial bombings and tank fire), and had state-of-the-art living conditions for garrisoned troops, air conditioning, comfortable eating areas and underground railways. However, it proved costly to maintain and subsequently led to parts of the French Armed Forces being underfunded and not provided with the troops, equipment and communications needed for the war.

The defenses were first proposed by Marshal Joffre. He was opposed by modernists such as Paul Reynaud and Charles de Gaulle who favored investment in armor and aircraft. Joffre had support from Henri Philippe P?tain, and there were a number of reports and commissions organised by the government. It was Andre Maginot who finally convinced the government to invest in the scheme. Maginot was another veteran of World War I; he became the French Minister of Veteran Affairs and then Minister of War (1928-1932).

Part of the rationale for the Maginot Line stemmed from the severe French losses during the First World War, and their effects on French demographics. The drop in the national birth rate during and after the war, resulting in a national shortage of young men, created an "echo" effect in the generation that provided the French conscript army in the mid-1930s. Faced with inadequate personnel resources, French planners had to rely more on older and less fit reservists, who would take longer to mobilize, and would diminish French industry because they would leave their jobs. Static defensive positions were therefore intended not only to buy time, but also to defend an area with fewer and less mobile forces. In practice, France deployed about twice as many men, 36 divisions (roughly one third of its force), for defense of the Maginot Line in Alsace and Lorraine, whereas the opposing German Army Group C only contained 19 divisions, or less than one seventh of the total force committed in the Manstein Plan for the invasion of France.

The line was built in several phases from 1930 by the STG (Service Technique du Genie) overseen by CORF (Commission d'Organisation des Regions Fortifies). The main construction was largely completed by 1939, at a cost of around 3 billion French francs.

The line stretched from Switzerland to Luxembourg, and a much lighter extension was extended to the Strait of Dover after 1934. The original line construction did not cover the area chosen by the Germans for their first challenge, which was through the Ardennes in 1940, a plan known as Fall Gelb, due to the neutrality of Belgium. The location of this attack, because of the Maginot Line, was through the Belgian Ardennes forest (sector 4), which is off the map to the left of Maginot Line sector 6.

Japan's Nanshin-ron vs. Hokushin-ron

The Southern Expansion Doctrine (Nanshin-ron) was a political doctrine in the Empire of Japan which stated that Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands were Japan's sphere of interest and that the potential value to the Japanese Empire for economic and territorial expansion in those areas was greater than elsewhere.

This political doctrine was diametrically opposite that of the "Northern Expansion Doctrine" (Hokushin-ron) largely supported by the Imperial Japanese Army, which stated the same except with regards to Manchuria and Siberia. After the military setbacks at Nomonhan on Mongolian front, the Second Sino-Japanese War, and negative Western attitudes towards Japanese expansionist tendencies, Southern Expansion Doctrine superseded to procure colonial resources in South East Asia and neutralize the threat posed by Western military forces in the Pacific.

The formal annexation and incorporation of the Bonin Islands and Taiwan into the Japanese Empire can be viewed as first steps in implementation of the "Southern Expansion Doctrine" in concrete terms.

However, World War I had a profound impact on the "Southern Expansion Doctrine". Japan was able to occupy the vast areas in the Pacific formerly controlled by the German Empire: i.e. the Caroline Islands, Mariana Islands, Marshall Islands and Palau. In 1919, these island groups officially became a League of Nations mandate of Japan and came under the administration of the Imperial Japanese Navy. The focus of the ?Southern Expansion Doctrine? expanded to include these island groups (Nan'yo), the economic and military development of which came to be viewed as essential to Japan's security.

The "Southern Expansion Doctrine" was officially adopted as national policy with the promulgation of the Toa shin Shitsujo (New Order in East Asia) from 1936 at the "Five Ministers Conference" (attended by the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Finance Minister, Army Minister and Navy Minister), with the resolution to advance south peacefully.

The Doctrine also formed part of the doctrinal basis of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere proclaimed by Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro from July 1940. Resource-rich areas of Southeast Asia were earmarked to provide raw materials for Japan's industry, and the Pacific Ocean was to become a 'Japanese lake'. In September 1940, Japan occupied northern French Indochina, and in November, the Pacific Islands Bureau (Nan'yo Kyoku) was established by the Foreign Ministry. While the events of the Pacific War from December 1941 overshadowed further development of the "Southern Expansion Doctrine", the Greater East Asia Ministry was created in November 1942, and a Greater East Asia Conference was held in Tokyo in 1943. During the war, the bulk of Japan's diplomatic efforts remained directed at Southeast Asia. The "Southern Expansion Doctrine" was brought to an end by Japan's defeat in World War II.