War Stories

Top Gun
The United States Navy Strike Fighter Tactics Instructor program (SFTI program), more popularly known as Topgun or TOPGUN, teaches fighter and strike tactics and techniques to selected Naval Aviators and Naval Flight Officers, who return to their operating units as surrogate instructors. It began as the United States Navy Fighter Weapons School, established on March 3, 1969, at the former Naval Air Station Miramar, north of San Diego, California. In 1996, the School was merged into the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center at NAS Fallon, Nevada.

In 1968, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Thomas Hinman Moorer ordered Captain Frank Ault to research the failings of the U.S. air-to-air missiles used in combat in the skies over North Vietnam. Operation Rolling Thunder, which lasted from 2 March 1965 to 1 November 1968, ultimately saw almost 1,000 U.S. aircraft losses in about one million sorties. Rolling Thunder became the Rorschach test for the Navy and Air Force, which drew nearly opposite conclusions. The USAF concluded that its air losses were primarily due to unobserved MiG attacks from the rear, and were therefore a technology problem. The service responded by upgrading its F-4 Phantom II fleet, installing an internal 20mm Vulcan cannon (replacing the gun pods carried under the aircraft's belly by Air Force Phantom units, such as the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing), developing improved airborne radar systems, and working to solve the targeting problems of the AIM-9 and AIM-7 air-to-air missiles.

In May 1968, the Navy published the "Ault Report", which concluded that the problem stemmed from inadequate air-crew training in air combat maneuvering (ACM). This was welcomed by the F-8 Crusader community, who had been lobbying for an ACM training program ever since Rolling Thunder began. The Ault Report recommended establishment of an "Advanced Fighter Weapons School" to revive and disseminate community fighter expertise throughout the fleet. CNO Moorer concurred.

In 1996, the transfer of NAS Miramar to the Marine Corps was coupled with the incorporation of TOPGUN into the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) at NAS Fallon, Nevada.

In 2002, the Navy began to receive 14 F-16A and B models from the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center (AMARC) that were originally intended for Pakistan before being embargoed. These aircraft (which are not designated F-16N/TF-16N) are operated by the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) for adversary training and, like their F-16N predecessors, are painted in exotic schemes.

TOPGUN instructors currently fly the F/A-18A/B/C/D/E/F Hornet and Super Hornet as well as the undelivered Pakistani F-16A/B Fighting Falcon.

In early 1944, the Marauders were organized as light infantry assault units, with mule transport for their 60 mm mortars, bazookas, ammunition, communications gear, and supplies. Although the 5307th's three battalions were equivalent to a regimental-size unit, its lack of organic heavy weapons support meant the force had a combat power less than that of a single regular American infantry battalion, a fact that General Stilwell and his NCAC staff did not always appreciate. Without heavy weapons support, the unit would have to rely on flexibility and surprise to outfight considerably larger Japanese forces.

Weight was critical to the Marauders, and the need for a compact, lightweight field ration was essential; unfortunately, the best solution, the dry Jungle ration, at 4,000 calories per day, had been discontinued for cost reasons in 1943. On the advice of Army supply officers in Washington, General Stilwell and his G-4 staff determined that a one-per-day issuance of the U.S. Army's 2,830 calorie K ration would be sufficient to maintain the Marauders in the field. While compact, the K ration not only had fewer calories but less bulk, and included some components so unappetizing as to be thrown away by nearly all users.

On the advice of British General Orde Wingate, the force was divided into two self-contained combat teams per battalion. In February 1944, in an offensive designed to disrupt Japanese offensive operations, three battalions in six combat teams (coded Red, White, Blue, Khaki, Green, and Orange) marched into Burma. On February 24th, the force began a 1000-mile march over the Patkai region of the Himalayas and into the Burmese jungle behind Japanese lines. A total of 2,750 Marauders entered Burma; the remaining 247 men remained in India as headquarters and support personnel.

While in Burma, the Marauders were usually outnumbered by Japanese troops from the 18th division, but always inflicted many more casualties than they suffered. Led by Kachin scouts, and using mobility and surprise, the Marauders harassed supply and communication lines, shot up patrols, and assaulted Japanese rear areas, in one case cutting off the Japanese rearguard at Maingkwan. Near Walawbum, a town believed by General Stilwell's NCAC staff to be lightly held, the 3rd Battalion killed some 400?500 enemy soldiers. The Japanese were continually surprised by the heavy, accurate volume of fire they received when attacking Marauder positions. Its combat-experienced officers had carefully integrated light mortar and machine gun fires, and virtually every man was armed with a self-loading or automatic weapon in which he had trained to a high level of marksmanship. In March, they severed Japanese supply lines in the Hukawng Valley.

Informed by the British that the situation in Imphal was under control, Stilwell wanted to launch a final assault to capture the Japanese airfield at Myitkyina. Always guarded against the potential for interference by the British, General Stilwell did not coordinate his plans with Admiral Mountbatten, instead transmitting separate orders to his Chinese forces and the Marauders. The men took a brief rest at Shikau Gau, a jungle village clearing where they bartered with the native inhabitants for fresh eggs and chickens with an issue of 10-in-one and C rations. The Marauders also took the opportunity to sunbathe in an attempt to control the onset of various fungal skin diseases. Now down to a little over 2,200 officers and men, the 5307th began a series of battles on the march to Myitkyina.

In April, the Marauders were ordered by General Stilwell to take up a blocking position at Nhpum Ga and hold it against Japanese attacks, a conventional defensive action for which the unit had not been equipped. At times surrounded, the Marauders coordinated their own battalions in mutual support to break the siege after a series of fierce assaults by Japanese forces. At Nhpum Ga, the Marauders killed 400 Japanese soldiers, while suffering 57 killed in action, 302 wounded, and 379 incapacitated due to illness and exhaustion. Of the unit's 200 mules, 75 were killed by artillery and mortar fire. A concurrent outbreak of amoebic dysentery (contracted after linking up with Chinese forces) further reduced their effective strength. Although the Marauders had previously avoided losses from this deadly disease (in part by use of halazone tablets and strict field sanitation procedures), their encampment with Chinese infantry, who used the rivers as latrines, proved their undoing (the Chinese troops, who always boiled their drinking water, were not seriously affected).

The disadvantages of supplying Marauders with a single K ration per day now made themselves felt, as the troops became increasingly malnourished; the onset of the rainy season combined with Japanese pressure and inhospitable terrain prevented many supply drops, exacerbating the problem. Even now, one K ration (three meals) per day was deemed adequate by General Stilwell's staff, augmented by occasional drops of dry rice, jam, bread, candy, and C rations. When encountering Chinese troops, many men began to barter their K ration cigarettes for rice and other foods.